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INTRODUCTION
The signing of the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty was the maturation of an idea that was
born thirty-six years ago. That treaty placed into effect the
200 mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A universal 200 mile
EEZ could be a death knell for the high-seas fishing fleets we
know today as the majority of the major fishing grounds lie
within 200 miles of the coast.
The Soviet Union presently has the largest fishing fleet
in the world and will perhaps feel the largest impact from the
treaty signing. In the post World War II era, the Soviet Union
became dedicated to becoming the world's major fish producer.
By the late 1960's, Soviet vessels could be spotted on every
major fishing ground around the globe. In spite of the great
amount of capital invested, the Soviets could not displace
Japan as the world's largest fish producer.
This paper intends to evaluate what impact the treaty will
have on the Soviet fishing industry. The exclusion of the
fleet from many of the major fishing grounds is sure to reduce
the catch totals. Just how much the catch will be reduced is
open to conjecture. An analysis of history is sure to provide
an indication of the extent of the reduction. The effects of
earlier EEZ's can be evaluated closely to see how much, if any,
the local Soviet catch dropped.
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Two other areas that need to be studied are bilateral
fishing agreements and the use of joint ventures. The Soviets
have used both concepts for years in various parts of the
world. Their dependence upon these mechanisms is certain to
increase dramatically. In fact, they have been used as tools
to further the teachings of Marx and Lenin and broaden the
sphere of Soviet influence.
2
CHAPTER I
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE DEVELOPMENT
Development.
The concept of a 200 mile EEZ was born in 1952 when Chile,
Peru, and Ecuador claimed a 200 mile territorial sea in the
Declaration of Santiago. 1 It was originally conceived to
curb a pelagic whaling fleet being fitted by a Greek shipowner
to work off South America. The concept was first rejected as
being the whim of a few "small time" politicians and later con-
tested bitterly as Peru began to exploit her own coastal
resources.
The 1960's saw the deployment of large distant water
fishing fleets off foreign shores. This caused a great deal of
concern for many of the developing countries. In 1967, the
Soviets caught 677,000 tons of hake from the Patagonian Shelf
off Argentina. 2 In response, Argentina joined the "Santiago
Three" and declared a 200 mile territorial sea in late 1967. 3
The Soviets were forced to acknowledge this claim and left
Argentine waters.
The Soviet fleet then moved north to Uruguay. Uruguay
declared a 200 mile territorial sea in 1969, pushing the
Soviets further north to Brazil. The Brazilian government
quickly established a 200 mile territorial sea (1970) to
quickly push the Soviet fleet out of the area. 4 By the end
of the 1960's, 15 countries claimed limits exceeding 12
'I 5ml. es.
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South America was not the only area that became concerned
by the large Soviet fishing fleet during the 1960's. The
United States saw extensive Soviet fishing on both coasts
during the 1960's. This caused a great deal of concern in the
American fishing industry and subsequently, the halls of
Congress. As a result, the United States passed a 12-mile
exclusive fishing zone. 6 Although deemed sufficient at the
time, the United States, a decade later, also declared a
comparable 200-mile exclusive fishing zone. 7
The concept began to take hold during the 1970's. The
developing countries saw a means of giving their small coastal
fishing fleets a chance to compete with the large distant water
fleets. At the UNCLOS III in 1973, the developing countries
showed a great deal of concern over the depletion of fish
stocks caused by the escalating efforts of distant-water
fishing fleets. 8 The consensus was that individual states
should have increased management authority over fisheries off
their coasts. They also agreed that coastal states should have
preferential rights in respect to adjacent fish resources.
In Caracas, in 1974, the debate quickly demonstrated that
the coastal state concern was deeply held and strongly
supported by a large majority of states participating in the
Conference. 9 By the end of the Caracas session, what was
once just a Latin American aberration had become the standard
of expectation and the basis of negotiation. It became a fore-
gone conclusion that the 200 mile EEZ would be universally ac-
10
cepted at an early date.
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It was after the Caracas session that a number of
countries claimed increased economic zones. Table 1 shows the
years that each country extended their jurisdiction. By the
end of 1980, 87 countries were to have claimed EEZ's of 200
miles. 1 1 In fact, of the ten leading fishing countries, only
the People's Republic of China had extended jurisdiction less
than 200 miles (see Table 1).
The Argentine-Soviet incident was not the only one to have
major international implications. The Cod War of 1979 and 1980
brought Iceland and Great Britain to an armed confrontation. 1 2
Warships on both sides were used to stress their respective
government's wishes. It was only Iceland's persistence which
was to finally win out in the tense, potentially highly explo-
sive situation.
The acts that made the 200 mile EEZ a recognized standard
were the declarations of the United States, Canada, Norway, the
European Economic Community (EEC) and the USSR. With this
group of countries supporting the EEZ, it was to become only a
matter of time before it became an internationally recognized
standard.
Soviet Stand.
Many people were quite surprised when the Soviet Union
showed their support for the 200 mile EEZ. Without a doubt,
their fishing industry had the most to lose. In fact, 99 per-
cent of all of the presently exploited fish stocks would come
d 'I'" d" t" 13 H th S 't f' h'un er nat10na Jur1s 1C 10n. owever, e OV1e 1S 1ng
interests were secondary to interests of the Soviet Navy.
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TABLE 1
NATIONS CLAIMING EXTENDED JURISDICTION AND YEAR OF
ENTRY INTO FORCE (DECEMBER 1980)
200 miles
Exclusive economic zones:
Bangladesh 1974 Surinam 1978
Barbados 1979 Togo 1977
Burma 1977 Venezuela 1978
Cape Verde 1978 Vietnam 1977
Colombia 1978 Western Samoaa
Comoro Islands 1976 PDR Yemen 1978
Costa Rica 1975
Cuba 1977 Exclusive fishing zones:
Dominican Rep. 1977
Fijaa Angola 1976
France 1977 Australia 1979
Grenada 1978 The Bahamas 1977
Guatemala 1976 Canada 1977
Guinea Bissau 1978 Chile 1952
Haiti 1977 Denmark 1977
Honduras 1951 Gambia 1978
Iceland 1979 FR Germany 1977
India 1977 Guyana 1977
Indonesia 1980 Ireland 1977
Ivory Coast 1977 Japan 1977
Kampuchea 1978 Kiribati 1978
Kenya 1979 Rep of Korea 1954
DPR Korea 1977 Netherlands 1977
Malaysiad 1980 Oman 1977Maldives 1976 Senegal 1976
Mauritania 1978 Solomon Islands 1978
Mauritius 1977 South Africa 1977
Mexico e 1976 Sweden 1978
Morocco 1980 Tuvala 1978
Mozambique 1976 UK 1977
New Zealand 1978 USA 1977
Nicaragua 1978 USSR 1976
Nigeria 1980 Vanuatu 1978
Norway 1977
Pakistan 1976
Papua New Guinea 1978
Offshore waters
Philippines 1979
Portugal 1977
Sao Tomee
Principe 1978
Seych~lles 1977
Spain 1978
Sri Lanka. 1977
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Territorial Sea:
Argentina
Benin
Brazil
PR Congo
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ghana
Guinea
Liberia
Panama
1967
1976
1970
1977
1966
1950
1977
1965
1976
1967
Peru 1947
Sovereignty and
jurisdiction over
the sea, its soil
and subsoil
Sierra Leone 1971
Somali Democratic
Republic 1972
Uruguay 1969
Extension between 12-200 miles:
Albania 1976 15 miles Madagascar 1973 50 miles
Belgium 1978 median line Malta 1978 24 miles
Cameroon 1974 50 miles polang 1978 median line
Gabon 1972 100 miles Qatar 1974
GDR 1978 median line Saudi bIranb,c 1973 Arabia 1974
Tanzania 1973 50 miles
ab Legislation enacted. Entry into force pending.
Outer limit of superjacent waters of the continental shelf.
c Median line in Sea of Oman.d
e Areas defined by geographic coordinates.
Except Mediterranean.
Source: Tony Loftas, "FAO's EEZ Programme," Marine Policy,
July 1981, pp. 233, Table 5.
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Originally, the Soviets opposed the 200 mile EEZ. They
claimed:
Some States were seeking to permit the coastal State
to set its own limits for the economic zone. Such a
proposal would create chaos in the delimitation of
the high seas and was Ilearly motivated by political
and hegemonistic aims.
The major Soviet fear was that economic zones would creep and
become zones of political control as well. This would serve to
limit the maneuverability of the Soviet Navy, merchant marine,
d h ' h 15an oceanograp 1C researc •
Even if the EEZ's did not creep, they would endanger
Soviet ocean use by withdrawing the world's most productive
fishing waters from the high seas and putting fishing resources
within the coastal states' jurisdiction. They argued that fish
only lived for a short period of time and if not caught and
utilized, they would die. It was wrong to waste any available
resources of fish with a large percentage of the world popula-
tion suffering from starvation. 16 They argued that EEZ's
"would in practice mean the end of technically well-equipped
and very economically run deep-sea fishing, and its replacement
by small fleets of coastal tramp vessels." The fact that the
Soviet Union exports only 4-1/2 percent of her catch shows her
dependence on her fishing investment and food supply.1?
The Soviet Union recognized the need to make some
concessions on the fisheries questions to guarantee her freedom
for her other fleets. The following statement shows their
willingness to make concessions:
8
· . • some States consider that if the territorial
sea were fixed at twelve miles, the coastal States
might have to receive some special fishing rights
beyond the limits of the territorial sea in con-
tiguous areas. The Soviet Union fully understands
the importance of that matter and tB ready to seek
for its just and correct solution.
The initial Soviet solution was contained in its 1972 draft
article on fishing. It provided the coastal States with a
share of the anadromous species but purposely excluded them
from any preferential treatment for the nonanadromous species.
This would not disturb the Soviet fishing off North America and
19Western Europe.
However, the EEZ claims of the United States, Norway,
Canada, and the Common Market left the Soviets no alternative.
They realized that "the handwriting was on the wall" and moved
to make the most of the situation. On December 10, 1976, the
Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet published a decree on
temporary measures for the preservation of living resources and
regulation of fishing in the marine regions contiguous to the
coast of the Soviet Union. 20
This legislative act temporarily established a 200 mile
EEZ pending the signing of the UNCLOS III treaty. This was
done to "safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union." They
claimed that unlike other countries, their measures were only
temporary measures to protect the living resources. The decree
was in strict accordance with the provisions of the treaty.
This decree showed that the Soviet Union fully supported the
UNCLOS III treaty and intended to use their support as a rally-
ing point for the developing countries.
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CHAPTER II
DRAFT LAW OF THE SEA TREATY FISHING PROVISIONS
Exclusive Economic Zone.
Fisheries was one of the major items addressed during the
conferences. The large, highly efficient fleets of Japan, the
Soviet Union, Korea and others had caused a great deal of con-
cern in most of the developing countries as well as a few
developed countries. Some way was needed to protect the
coastal fisheries and prevent over-exploitation of the fish
stocks themselves. The treaty made provisions to cover both of
these areas.
The basic item was the standardization of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). Article 55 was used to define what the
EEZ is. It was defined as follows:
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the
specific legal regime established in this Pact,
under which the rights and jurisdiction of the
coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other
States are gover~ld by the relevant provisions of
this convention.
This article legalized in international law a concept that had
been growing in popularity since the 1950's. The breadth of
the EEZ was established as 200 nautical miles measured from the
baseline of the territorial sea. 22
According to the treaty, the coastal State has complete
control over the fisheries in its territorial and internal
waters by virtue of its sovereignty over the area. The
sovereign rights include exploring, exploiting, conserving, and
10
managing the natural resources, both living and non-living, in
the EEZ. Conservation of the resources was to be a primary
concern. It will establish the quotas that are available to
their own fishing fleets.
The treaty also requires that the coastal State gives
other States access to the "surplus" of the total allowable
catch. The coastal State has to follow certain criteria in the
allotment of its surplus. The high seas fleets will need to
establish the fact that many areas where they currently are
operating are habitual fishing grounds. This need is of
paramount importance. If this is established, the fleet can
justify its claim to a portion of the total catch regardless of
its relations with the coastal State. Once the precedent is
established, the Soviets may be able to force themselves into
many of the EEZ's around the world.
The "total allowable catch" (TAC) may be the concept with
the greatest amount of controversy. Biologically, this quota
will be extremely difficult to establish. A country may set a
quota low enough that their own fisheries catch the entire
quota with no surplus. Another State that habitually fishes
the EEZ has a right to a percentage of the catch. The State
could take the coastal State into an international court of law
and force it to justify its value for "TAC." Many of the
developing States will have extreme difficulty in justifying
their TAC in the face of the developed countries' superior
fishery research fleets.
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This also brings about another problem: that being the
difficulty of setting a TAC. This is based on the concept of
Optimum Sustainable Yield (OSY) which in turn is based on
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). Although both of these
concepts work well in theory, their effectiveness in reality is
highly questionable. Both of these concepts are really
somewhat nebulous. The concept of MSY has been described as:
• . . based on many premises which may not be true.
MSY assumes that the stock is more or less self-con-
tained and before exploitation has attained a steady
state at the carrying capacity during the period of
exploitation. • .. Finally, it assumes that the
process of reducing the stock is reversible. MSY
concentrates on the stock to the exclusion of such
factors as relationships within a trophic level,
relationships between trophic levels, and changes in
carrying c~~acity due to factors such as climate and
pollution.
It is quite conceivable that two different people will come up
with two different MSY's given the same set of information. If
fishing authorities cannot agree on a method, then how can
politicians be expected to reach a consensus answer. The lack
of research facilities in the developing countries is certain
to damage their creditability.
Optimum sustainable yield was the concept used in the
draft treaty. Based on MSY, the treaty defines it as "maximum
sustainable yield as qualified by relevant environmental and
economic factors.,,24 This definition is meaningless.
Sometimes OSY will be zero; other times it will be MSY. There
is no operational basis for making a decision. This leaves
open many avenues for litigation and negotiation.
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What is likely to happen is that there will be hard
negotiations around the world concerning the TAC. The
countries that have the most to give will be the ones that gain
the most. The Soviet Union certainly stands to gain the most
in this regard.
Along with the concept of OSY is the objective of optimum
utilization. Article 62 requires that the coastal State must
strive to achieve this objective. This is based on a philoso-
phy that a fishing resource not fully utilized is a resource
wasted. This concept is questionable at best. Many feel that
this only serves the needs of the more powerful fishing
nations. It also can be used as a tool in litigation and
negotiations to gain a percentage of a country's TAC.
High Seas Fishing
The treaty also deals with fisheries on the high seas.
The treaty attempts to deal with these in a fashion that is
identical to those for the EEZ. If the legislation's effects
in the EEZ are questionable, the same laws for the high seas is
ridiculous. At least in the EEZ, there is a coastal State as a
central authority fixing the TAC, enforcing conservation
measures and allotting the surplus to competing States. The
high seas fisheries have not central management authority. The
TAC is fixed by the fishing States in negotiations among them-
selves. The non-fishing States have no voice in the matter.
The basis is not unlike the earlier Geneva Convention on
fisheries. 25 Its provisions for overfishing were simply
rhetoric to the fishing nations about conservation. There were
13
no mechanisms for reducing the quantities of fish caught among
the fishing states. If the regulations won1t work under the
auspices of the Geneva Convention on fisheries, what makes the
United Nations believe that essentially the same laws under a
different title (UNCLOS III) will work any better?
Anadromous Species.
The anadromous species and their unique problems were also
addressed in the treaty. It gave the State of origin the
primary responsibility for conservation and management of the
anadromous stocks. These stocks should be fished in the rivers
and EEZ1s of the State of origin. The high seas fishing for
the stocks would be controlled by negotiations and agreements
among the States concerned. The TAC will be set by the State
of origin but it must consult other States and all of them must
agree to the revised quotas. The only guidelines given are
that the interests of the coastal State and conservation will
be kept in mind. The economic dislocation of the high-seas
fishing States is to be avoided.
The only enforcer of quotas is the State of origin itself.
They are dependent on the figures supplied by the high-seas
fishing States concerning their total catch. There is no way
to ban or effectively control high seas fishing for these
stocks. The State of origin does not have the authority to
intercept and board the high-seas fleets of other States. The
major fishing nations certainly hold the cards in future bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements that will cover the anadro-
mous species.
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Highly Migratory Species.
The highly migratory species (tunas) were also addressed
in the treaty. Article 64 dealt specifically with these unique
fisheries.
1. The coastal State and other States whose
nationals fish in the region for the highly migra-
tory species listed in annex I shall cooperate dir-
ectly or through appropriate international organiza-
tions with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of
such species throughout the region both within and
beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions where
no appropriate international organization exists, the
coastal State and other States whose nationals harvest
these species in the region shall cooperate to estab- 26
lish such an organization and participate in its work.
It has been determined that 40 percent of the highly migratory
species are caught in the EEZ's. Most of the remaining 60 per-
cent caught on the high seas are by Japan, the U.S.A., Spain,
South Korea, and France. 27
The United States was one of the first countries to take a
stand on the highly migratory species. They claim that no one
State has control over these stocks as they move over very
large distances without reference to coastal waters. The fish
are pelagic; their appearance in a particular EEZ is one of
coincidence. However, it must be noted that the U.S. does not
have any significant stocks in the coastal waters. 28
A definite controversy occurs with regard to these fish
stocks. According to Article 56, the coastal State has
sovereign rights over the living resources in its EEZ. The
article does not make any exceptions. However, Article 64
tasks the States with cooperating directly or through
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international organizations to ensure conservation and optimum
utilization of such species both within and out of the EEZ.
Which article has precedence is unknown. Valid arguments can
be made by proponents of both sides concerning their interests.
Even if a conference is formed, there are no mechanisms to
force a State to adhere to the allocations allotted to it.
This is added to the fact that there is no requirement that a
country must participate in the conference. A State could join
a conference and remain a member as long as the quotas are to
their benefit. Once the quota is dropped, they could leave the
conference and act independently.
How to allocate the quotas is another problem. A
historical basis would not be fair to the developing States as
they are fairly new to these fisheries. The interests of the
large, high-seas fleets must also be looked after as the
developing countries should not be able to develop their
fisheries at the developed countries expense. It is highly
unlikely that any quota could be reached that would be
acceptable to all parties. These fisheries will probably
continue as they have throughout history.
As we can see, the treaty has a number of problem areas.
Most of these areas can be either ignored or used to the
advantage of the high seas fleets. The treaty standardized the
200 nautical mile EEZ but it provided mechanisms for the high
seas fleets to enter the EEZ's and demand their share. The
high seas, anadromous, and highly migrational fisheries quite
often simply restated the status quo. Perhaps this was
16
intentioned to ensure the acceptance of the treaty. The high-
seas fleets will continue to fish these stocks as they always
have.
17
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET FISHING INDUSTRY
To effectively determine where the Soviet fishing industry
is headed in the future, one must look at the past to determine
how and more importantly why they've done what they have.
Presently, they have the world's largest fleet in terms of
number of vessels and combined tonnage. 29 This rise has not
been accidental but the results of a total dedication towards
the goals of becoming the world's major fish producer.
The fishing fleet's history has undergone three different
stages in reaching today's status: pre-revolutionary Russia,
the revolution through World War II, and the third stage, post-
World War II Russia. The fourth stage began with the signing
of the new UNCLOS III treaty.
Pre-Revolutionary Russia.
Fishing has been an occupation of Russians since the
middle of the 12th century. Most of the lakes and rivers of
European Russia were fished by local inhabitants. Even then,
fishing was an act of the State; the fishermen at the White
Lake Fish Yard were under the direct control of the Department
of the Great Palace in Moscow. 3 0
By the end of the fifteenth century, all of the rivers and
lakes in the settled areas were fished. There was some trade
in caviar and salt fish (sturgeon) but most was consumed
locally. Fishing was the major stimulus in the exploration and
development of new territories in central and Asian Russia. 3 l
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Fisheries development really picked up steam during the
late 1800's. The development of steamships provided the nation
with the ability to supply many of the districts in European
Russia. The building of railroads further facilitated the
transportation of fish.
Legislative reforms also promoted fisheries development.
Two major pieces of legislation were the abolition of serfdom
(1861 reform) and the salt tax abolition. 32 With the
abolition of serfdom, the available labor pool grew drastic-
ally. The salt tax revocation lowered production costs and
greatly raised the investors' profits. Both reforms made the
industry financially attractive.
The abolition of private fishing grounds, their transfer
to state management, and the granting of fishing rights to the
general public also promoted the development of fishing.
The fishing was concentrated in the inland bodies of
water. These provided 82.7 percent of the total catch. The
high seas fleet accounted for only 17.3 percent. 33 The
Caspian Sea was undoubtedly the most important body of water as
63.1 percent of the total catch came from this sea. This was
over twice as great as that for any body of water.
The catch increased 328 percent in the period from 1860 to
1913 (see Table 2). The development was quite irregular as the
primary motivating factor was profit. High seas fleets with
their associated high costs were ignored as their profit level
could not compare with the inland waters.
19
During this period, the Russian catch was not great enough
to meet the local demand. A number of European States imported
fish to meet this demand. Many of these same fish were caught
in Russian waters. At the time, the Russian government was
11 d d h E 11 · 34tota y epen ent on er Western uropean a 1es. It was
to their benefit not to have the Russians develop a high seas
fleet to compete with European fleets.
The Russian fishing fleet was technically extremely
backward. Only ninety vessels of a total hundred thousand were
motorized. 35 For over a century, the main fishing vessels
were mother ships with catcher boats, all sail-driven. The
fish were unloaded by hand and moved by wheelbarrow. Because
of the fish's perishable nature, the catch had to be sold
immediately.
World War I put an end to the Russian fishing industry's
development. The fishing in the North dropped to half its
former volume, and the fishing in the Baltic virtually
stopped. 36 The government bought ready-made fish products
from various entrepeneurs to supply their army. The only
unaffected fisheries were in the Far East and Western Siberia.
Reconstruction and Industrialization.
World War I and the revolution definitely took their toll
on the fishing industry. In 1920, the catch dropped off and
was then lower than the catch total for 1860 (Table 2). Lenin
saw the need to industrialize all facets of the Soviet economy.
However, the civil war precluded any build-up or development of
industry.
20
The damage to the fishing industry was incalculable. Many
vessels and much gear were destroyed in the Volga-Caspian
region. 37 Many of the fishermen were mobilized and the food
shortages made many others take up farming. In 1919, the catch
dropped to an all-time low of 170,000 tons. In spite of the
conditions, the Caspian Sea remained the principal source of
fish products.
Associations were formed to rehabilitate the fishing
industry. These associations bought fish from the fishermen
and in return sold them the materials to continue in the trade.
These were instrumental in raising the 1920 catch to 257,000
tons. 3 8
To further rehabilitate the high seas fishing fleet, the
Soviet government took steps to protect its resources from
foreign fishing industries. The decree "The Protection of
Fishing and Hunting Grounds of the Arctic Ocean and the White
Sea" was signed by Lenin in 1920. This extended the territorial
waters of the U.S.S.R. to twelve miles.
The reconstruction of the fishing industry was completed
by 1930. The catch exceeded the 1913 level for the first time
(see Table 2). The fishery unions were continuing to grow in
strength. They comprised sixty percent of the industry in
1930. Stable prices and an increased demand were instrumental
factors that led to a successful recovery.
Once the reconstruction was complete, the Soviet Union
launched an industrialization drive. This drive caused a rapid
growth in urban areas and subsequently caused a need to develop
21
TABLE 2
SOVIET CATCH BY YEAR (1860-1980)
Year
1860*
1913
1917
1920
1925*
1930
1935
1948
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975**
1980**
Soviet Catch
(1,000,000 Tons)
.32
1.05
.89
.26
.896
1. 28
1.49
1. 63
2.50
3.05
4.98
7.25
9.96
9.41
Percent of
World Catch
7.6
7.8
8.6
7.7
9.5
11. 0
14.99
13.03
*Sysoev, N. P., Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry,
Translated by the Israel Program for Scientific Translations
(Jerusaleum: Keter Press, 1974), p. 17.
**United Nations, Food and Agricultural Organization, 1980
Yearbook of Fishery Statistics~ Catches and Landings, Vol.
50, 1981, pp. 41-42.
Source: U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce and
National Ocean Policy, Soviet Oceans Development,
Comm. Print, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976, pp. 397,
Table 2.
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the food industry. Fisheries was a way seen to help supply
food to these growing urban areas. The only way seen to
increase the catch without damaging the fish stocks was to
expand fishing in the open seas.
The Soviet government began to invest and industrialize
its fishing fleet. Table 3 shows the capital investments made
in the fishing industry beginning in the first five-year period
(1929-1932). As can be seen, the majority of the investments
were to construct shore-based processing plants. Over 91
percent of the total investment went for this development. 39
This development altered the entire nature of the Soviet
industry. No longer were the fleets limited to salted fish or
fresh fish for local consumption only. They developed the
capability to ship their products around the country.
During the same time period, the fishing vessels became
multi-purpose. They could handle various types of fishing
(seine, drift nets, and trawls).40 In spite of the small
percentage of the capital assets devoted to vessel
construction, the fleet increased from 1,336 vessels in 1930 to
5,987 vessels in 1940. 41 This was a 440 percent increase.
The private sector was eliminated during this time period.
The emphasis was shifting from inland waters to a high
seas fleet. More of the vessels were now capable of operating
at sea. The inland waters capacity started to decline. This
was due to a number of reasons. The most notable was the drop
in water level in many of the inland seas. 42 This was caused
by the decrease in river runoff caused by dam construction.
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TABLE 3
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN THE SOVIET FISHING INDUSTRY, BY PLANNING PERIODS
(in million rubles)
Total in- Per For fishing fleet For shore-based plants
Period vestment Year Total Per Year Total Per Year
1st FYP: 1929-1932 17.6 4.4 1.6 0.4 16.0 4.0
2nd FYP: 1933-1937 55.0 11.0 5.0 1.0 50.0 10.0
3rd FYP: 1938-1940 46.2 15.4 3.6 1.2 42.6 14.2
1941-1945 96.8 19.4 7.7 1.5 89.1 17.8
4th FYP: 1946-1950 366.0 73.2 218.0 43.6 148.0 29.6
5th FYP: 1951-1955 721.0 144.2 386.0 77.2 335.0 67.0
6th FYP: 1956-1958 886.5 295.5 560.1 186.7 326.5 108.8
7th FYP: 1959-1965 2,032.0 290.3 1,533.5 219.1 498.5 71.2
8th FYP: 1966-1970 3,500.0 700.0 2,450.0 490.0 1,050.0 210.0
9th FYP: 1971-1975 4,000.0 800.0 2,600.0 520.0 1,400.0 280.0
TOTAL 11,721.1 254.8 7,765.5 168.8 3,955.6 86.0
Source: U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy,
Soviet Ocean Development, Committee Print, 94th Congress, 2d Sess., 1976,
pg. 390, Table 1.
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This raised the salinity of the bodies of water causing a de-
crease in reproduction.
The fishing industry once again received extensive damage
during World War II. A large part of the processing and catch-
ing capability was destroyed. The total loss (including the
potential catch) was valued at 200 million rubles. 43 The
entire economy switched to military production, which meant
that the fishing sector no longer received the supplies or
replacements it needed.
Two areas did exhibit growth during the war. The Far East
and Siberia exhibited accelerated growth. This allowed the
Soviets to supply the front and rear areas with fish products.
Each of these areas exhibited over 100 percent growth in 1942
alone. 44 As territories were liberated, reconstruction
cent below the prewar
began. By the end of
destroyed during the
Post World War II.
1945, the catch total was still 20 per-
figures. 45 Over 5,000 vessels were
46
war.
Following World War II, the primary goal became the recon-
struction of industry, agriculture, and the fishing industry.
The fishing industry was specifically tasked with four specific
items: (a) to provide fish products for consumers at home; (b)
to provide fodder meal for animal breeding; (c) to supply other
branches of industry with fish products, such as margarine pro-
duction, confections, pharmaceuticals, soap and textiles; and
(d) to ensure a positive foreign trade balance. 47 The
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intentions were to attain the pre-World War II catch totals by
1950. This was accomplished by 1974.
The Soviets following World War II began to view fisheries
somewhat differently. Their agricultural sector had always
been the weak link in the Soviet economy. The heavy manpower
losses of World War II made male farm manpower quite
scarce.
48 The turn to fisheries as a source of animal
protein was made for primarily economic reasons. The Soviet
view was stated best by S.V. Mikhailov •
. to produce 100 kilograms of live-weight beef,
it takes a capital investment of 2,000-2,500 rubles.
But for a similar amount of fish only about 1,500-
1,700 rubles are necessary. One must remember that
arable land is a relatively modest proportion of the
total surface area of the U.S.S.R., a country where
permafrost, deserts, and dense forests extend for
thousands of miles. The growing season is subject
to severe climactic extremes, and in ~90ught or flood
years, crops may be severely damaged.
In the early post-war years, most of the fishing vessels
were constructed in East Germany (GDR) where the Red Army was
the occupying force. These vessels were then shipped to the
U.S.S.R. as war reparations. 50 The extensive shipbuilding
program of the Soviet Navy kept the Soviet shipyards busy.
Because of this, the Soviets continued to buy foreign made
vessels. Today, they purchase vessels from France, the
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland,
East Germany, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. By
1975, the GDR had supplied the Soviet Union with over 1,800
f ' h' I 51~s ~ng vesse s.
Table 3 shows that there was a shifting of emphasis for
capital investments. The bulk of investments now went for
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fishing vessel investment instead of the shorebased processing
plants. In fact, the investments for the fourth five-year plan
(1946-1950) exceeded the total investments for the years 1929
through 1945.
It was obvious that a simple attainment of pre-World War
II levels was not the final goal. Something much larger was
the objective; becoming the world's leading fish-catching
nation.
The Soviets increased agricultural problems have increased
their dependence upon the sea for fishing products. Their
fishing fleet became of increasing importance and investments
continued to pour in. These investments were not without
results. The Soviet catch in only twenty-five years showed an
increase of 611 percent (see Table 1). The Soviet percent of
the world catch rose from 7.8 percent in 1950 to 14.99 percent
in 1975.
The Soviets continually expanded their area of operations
to include all of the world's major fishing grounds during this
phase. Quite often, fleets of 200 fishing vessels could be
spotted working fishing grounds thousands of miles away from
their Soviet homeports. To date, they have not accomplished
their goal of having the largest fishing catch but they do have
the world's largest fishing fleet. By 1973, the Soviets had
over 25 percent of all of the world's fishing vessels by number
and 56.2 percent of the world's vessel gross tonnage (see
Table 4). By 1980, the number of vessels dropped to 4,500 but
the gross tonnage remained the same. 52
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It's possible that the Soviets may never attain their
goal. The UNCLOS III treaty certainly damages their cause.
Perhaps even more damaging is their poor efficiency. Of all of
the major fishing nations, the Soviets have traditionally
caught the least fish with the most gear. Table 4 shows that
the Soviets caught only 1.32 metric tons per gross registered
ton. Comparing this with other States' totals shows just how
inefficient the Soviets have been in this phase of development.
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TABLE 4
HIGH-SEAS FISHERY FLEETS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, NUMBER OF VESSELS,
GROSS TONNAGE AND CATCH PER GROSS TON, 1973
Number Gross Percent of Fisheries Catch
of Tonnage Total World Catch (in per GRT
Country Vessels (in GRT) Tonnage million (mt ) (in mt)
U.S.S.R. 4,700 6,500,000 56.2 8.6 1.32
JAPAN 3,099 1,510,985 13.0 10.7 7.08
SPAIN 1,953 510,491 4.4 1.6 3.13
U.S. 1,577 357,620 3.1 2.7 7.55
NORWAY 604 202,745 1.8 3.0 14.80
OTHER 6,679 2,491,113 21.5 28.3 11.36
TOTAL 18,412 11,572,954 100.0 54.9 4.74
Source: U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce and National Ocean
Policy, Soviet Ocean Development, Committee Print, 94th Congress, 2d
Sess., 1976, p. 426, Table 4.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF FISHING BY REGIONS
As Table 5 shows, 1976 was the high water mark for the
U.S.S.R. fishing industry. Following that year, there were a
few years of decline followed by two years of a small increase.
One only needs to look at Table 1 to see that a large number of
nations declared 200 mile EEZ's during this period.
To effectively evaluate the future of Soviet fisheries,
these years will prove to be critical. Earlier declarations
simply forced the Soviets to move to other regions. Their
regional catch may have suffered but their total catch
continued to increase.
Each region's catch will be analyzed for its trends and
significant events (see Figure 1). In each case, there is a
direct correlation between the two. These will all provide
clues to what the future holds for the Soviet fishing industry.
Northeast Atlantic.
The Northeast Atlantic has been one of the traditional
fishing grounds of the Soviet Union. Their first high seas
fleet started in these waters. Although it was at one time the
major fishing grounds of the Soviet fleet, it has dropped in
importance in recent years as the Northwest Pacific has
increased in importance.
Table 6 shows that there has been an overall steady
increase in both the Soviet catch as well as the world catch.
The year by year totals have shown this increase not to be
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~FIGURE 1
World's Fishing Regions
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TABLE 5
SOVIET AND TOTAL WORLD CATCH FOR YEARS 1955-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. in % of World
Year Catch 1000 MT Inc. Catch 1000 MT Inc. Catch
1955 2500.01 128,310.0
1956 2,620.1 120.0 4.8 29,830.0 1,520.0 5.4 8.78
1957 2,530.0 -90.0 -3.44 30,810.0 980.0 3.28 8.21
1958 2,620.0 90.0 3.56 32,130.0 1,320.0 4.28 8.15
1959 2,760.0 140.0 5.34 35,600.0 3,470.0 10.8 7.75
1960 3,050.0 290.0 10.5 39,500.0 3,900.0 10.95 7.72
1961 3,250.0 200.0 6.56 42,900.0 3,400.0 8.61 7.58
1962 3,620.0 370.0 11.38 46,300.0 3,400.0 7.92 7.81
1963 3,980.0 360.0 9.94 47,400.0 1,100.0 2.37 8.40
1964 4,480.0 500.0 12.56 51,600.0 4,200.0 8.86 8.68
1965 5,099.9 619.9 13.83 53,700.0 2,100.0 4.07 9.50
1966 5,348.8 248.9 4.88 57,500.0 3,800.0 7.08 9.30
1967 5,777.2 428.4 8.01 61,100.0 3,600.0 6.26 9.46
1968 6,082.1 304.9 5.28 64,300.0 3,200.0 5.24 9.46
1969 6,498.4 416.3 6.84 62,900.0 -1,400.0 -2.18 10.33
1970 7,252.2 753.8 11. 6 69,300.0 6,400.0 10.17 10.46
1971 2 79.79 1.10 2 -3,239.2 -4.68 11.17,332.0 66,060.8
1972 7,752.4 420.4 5.73 52,020.3 -4,040.5 -6.12 12.5
1973 8,614.1 861. 7 11.11 62,701. 7 681.4 1.1 13.7
1974 9,255.4 641.3 7.44 66,466.2 3,764.5 6.0 13.92
1975 9,969.98 714.0 7.72 66,376.3 -89.9 0.14 15.02
1976 10,132.21 162.23 1.63 69,753.0 3,376.7 5.09 14.52
1977 9,347.44 -784.77 -7.75 68,914.0 -839.0 -1.21 13.56
1978 8,918.02 -429.42 -4.6 70,438.6 1,524.6 2.21 12.66
1979 9,114.0 195.98 2.2 71,265.6 827.0 1.17 12.79
1980 9,412.15 298.15 3.27 72,190.8 925.2 1.30 13.04
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp. 37-38,
2Table A-I.
1980, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 40-42,
Table A-I.
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TABLE 6
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC (27) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
1964 1 1 000 12.441,076.0 8,650.0
1965 1,048.0 -28.0 -2.6 9,620.0 970.0 11. 21 10.89
1966 1,147.7 99.7 9.51 10,200.0 580.0 6.03 11.25
1967 1,118.7 -29.0 -2.53 10,350.0 150.0 1.47 10.81
1968 1,416.1 297.4 26.58 10,250.0 -100.0 -0.97 13.82
1969 1,469.7 53.6 3.79 10,020.0 -230.0 -2.24 14.67
1970 1,561.8 92.1 6.27 10,600.6 580.6 5.79 14.73
1971 2 -189.2 -12.11 2 -232.4 -2.19 13.241,372.6 10,368.2
1972 1,267.6 105.0 -7.65 10,580.3 212.1 2.05 11.98
1973 1,606.5 338.9 26.74 11,152.6 572.3 5.41 14.40
1974 1,995.2 388.7 24.20 11,689.07 536.47 4.81 17.07
1975 2,401. 8 406.6 20.38 12,014.69 235.62 2.79 19.99
1976 2,543.75 141. 95 5.91 13,162.65 1,147.96 9.55 19.33
1977 2,001. 0 -542.75 -21.33 12,576.13 -586.62 4.46 15.91
1978 1,726.23 -274.77 -13.73 11,674.60 -901. 53 -7.17 14.79
1979 1,933.25 207.02 11.99 11,708.30 33.7 2.88 16.51
1980 1,983.17 49.92 2.58 11,711. 83 63.53 0.54 16.85
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp. 217,
2Table C-27.
1980, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 253,
Table C-27.
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quite so steady. Like the world total, 1976 was the year with
the largest catch, and the following years showed a similar
reduction.
The 1976 catch produced excess in the Northeast Atlantic
area. To alleviate some of this excess, fresh fish were
exported to Norway. A number of processing plants in northern
Norway were under the threat of having to make massive labor
layoffs. The Norwegians had already exhausted their quota so
they could not alleviate this problem. The U.S.S.R. exported
cod and shrimp to Norway to allow these plants to maintain
their emploYment. One plant in Tromso imported 2,000 tons of
shrimp that were valued at several million kroner. 54 This
caused a large public outcry in Norway. The government, in an
attempt to keep imports to a minimum, stated publicly that it
would import fish products only in emergencies. 53
The EEZ came to the Northeast Atlantic during the end of
1976. The Soviets were the first to declare in December 1976. 5 4
Shortly thereafter, the majority of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) countries declared their EEZ's.55 Norway later
declared 200 mile EEZ's around both Jan Mayen Island and
Spitzbergen Island. 56 This took away many of the traditional
Soviet fishing grounds.
The boundaries in the North Cape area were never properly
defined. The area of controversy was called the "grey zone."
Even the size of the grey area was open to controversy.
Finally in late 1977, the "grey zone" principle was agreed
upon. 57 The Soviet will held supreme as their desires won
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out. The Norwegians lost some territory as the sea frontier
was established west of their claim.
Undoubtedly, the EEZ declarations were instrumental in the
1977 and 1978 decline. In fact, of the total regional decline
of 586,520 metric tons, 542,750 metric tons of it were attri-
butable to the Soviets (see Table 6). 1978 saw the regional
decline double while the Soviets reduced their loss to only
half of the 1977 loss. These two years saw a 33 percent reduc-
tion in the catch total.
By 1979, the Norwegians recognized the "historic rights"
of the Soviet fishing fleet in the area. The Soviets were
given larger quotas in the Norwegian EEZ. This quota increase
was for the Soviet acknowledgement of the Norwegian fishing
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zone around Jan Mayen Island. The Soviets also transferred
some quotas back to Norway. These quotas spurred the increase
in catch for the years 1979 and 1980.
The EEC has developed an integrated fishing policy. Non-
member nations would be forced to deal with the EEC governing
body to obtain quotas in the EEZ. 59 The Soviets refuse to
negotiate with the EEC and state they will only sign treaties
with each individual State. This stalemate is sure to remain
for some time. Although Norway is a member nation, her alloca-
tions to the Soviet Union are exempt from the EEC's Fishing
Adm' . t t' 601n1S ra 10n.
The Soviets have continued negotiations with a number of
other nations. In November 1981, they signed a ten-year agree-
ment with Finland. The Finns were allowed to catch 35 tons of
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salmon in Soviet waters while the Soviets are allowed 3,600
d 9 0 f . th F . . h 61tons of herring an 0 tons 0 sprat 1n e 1nn1S zone.
Sweden and the U.S.S.R. have been negotiating since 1970.
Once again a boundary dispute is the cause of difficulties. The
area of dispute is around Gothland Island. The recent Soviet
violations of Sweden's territorial seas by submarines have
toughened the stance of both countries. 62 It is unlikely
that an agreement will be reached in the near future.
The British recently cut the flow of technological infor-
mation going to the Soviet Union. A licensing system was also
imposed on Soviet factory vessels in British waters. Both
items were steps to reduce the Soviet catch in British
waters. 63
The proximity to the Soviet Union insures this area as
continuing to be one of the major Soviet fishing grounds of the
future. The toughening stance of the EEC countries is sure to
reduce the catch totals but it will always remain at a highly
significant level.
Northwest Atlantic.
The Soviets first entered the region in 1956 when their
vessels appeared off Newfoundland. By 1961, they had expanded
southward to New England. By the early 1970's, the region was
producing at levels that were comparable with the Northeast
Atlantic and the Northwest Pacific. Table 7 shows these
trends. The Soviet catch had doubled in the period from 1964
to 1975.
36
TABLE 7
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC (21) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
645.51 1 19.041964 3,390.0
1965 886.5 241.0 37.34 3,760.0 370.0 10.91 23.58
1966 842.3 -44.2 -4.99 4,020.0 260.0 6.91 20.95
1967 623.1 -219.2 -26.02 4,030.0 10.0 0.24 15.46
1968 794.0 170.9 27.43 4,590.0 560.0 13.9 17.3
1969 982.7 188.7 23.77 4,360.0 -230.0 -5.01 22.54
1970 812.4 -170.3 -17.33 4,146.7 -213.3 -4.89 19.59
1971 2 209.2 25.75 2 174.3 4.20 23.641,021. 6 4,321.0
1972 1,150.0 128.4 12.57 4,289.6 -31.4 -0.73 26.81
1973 1,357.3 207.3 18.03 4,425.9 136.3 3.18 30.67
1974 1,157.03 -200.27 -14.76 3,949.22 -476.68 -10.77 29.30
1975 1,166.93 9.9 0.86 3,764.44 -184.78 -4.68 31.00
1976 852.68 -314.25 -26.93 3,385.55 -378.89 -10.06 25.19
1977 432.74 -419.94 -49.25 2,980.73 -404.82 -11. 96 14.52
1978 207.68 -225.06 -52.01 2,786.4 -194.33 -6.52 7.45
1979 125.19 -82.49 -39.72 2,841.44 55.04 1.98 4.41
1980 108.29 -16.9 -13.50 2,836.67 -4.77 0.17 3.82
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp , 215,
2Table C-21.
1980, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 250,
Table C-21.
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By 1976, overfishing in the region caused stock reduc-
tions. The International Council for North Atlantic Fisheries
(ICNAF) was forced to reduce established quotas by 22 percent. 64
At the same time, Canada closed her Atlantic ports to Soviet
vessels until the Soviets promised to reduce their catches off
Canadian shores. These two events caused a 27 percent decrease
in the Soviet catch. It is quite interesting to note that the
regional catch decreased only ten percent in spite of the ICNAF
quota reduction.
In 1977, both Canada and the United States declared EEZ's
or USFCZ of their own. 65 Both nations immediately set low
quotas for the Soviet fleet. These events reduced the Soviet
catch total by 49 percent. In fact, the regional catch loss
can be attributed completely to the Soviet Union. with their
catch excluded, the regional showed a 15,000 metric ton
increase. It was obvious that the Soviets' days in the North-
west Atlantic were numbered.
The decline continued as the quotas were reduced from year
to year. The eventual goal was to reduce all foreign fishing
within the respective EEZ's. By 1978, the Soviets' catch in
the USFCZ had been reduced to only 17,952 metric tons. 66
This catch was valued at $1,837,237. 67 By 1980, the Soviet
allocations in the USFCZ had reached zero. Their entire catch
amounted to only 108,290 metric tons which amounted to only 3.8
percent of the regional catch (see Table 7).
The Northwest Atlantic can be expected to play only a
minor role in the future of the Soviet fisheries. The declines
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will most likely taper off to a level where there is a constant
Soviet presence but probably nothing more.
West Central Atlantic.
The West Central Atlantic has never really contributed
much to the Soviet economy_ Their greatest year was 1972 when
73,800 metric tons were caught (see Table 8). This made up
only five percent of the regional total. After 1976, the
Soviets left the area and have not returned. It is highly
likely that the creation of the USFCZ and the expansion of the
Cuban fishing fleet have driven the Soviets out of the area.
East Central Atlantic.
As the Soviet Union expanded her area of operations, she
moved down to the East Central Atlantic. This area has tradi-
tionally been fished only by the native fishermen from the ad-
jacent coastal States. Major Soviet growth in the area
occurred during the 1967-1969 time frame (see Table 9). In
1969, the Soviets accounted for over 27 percent of the region's
total fisheries. In only nine years, the region went from only
three percent of the Soviet catch to over eleven percent by
1973. 68 This region had become the fourth most important
fishing region to the Soviets.
The Soviets continued their expansion into the area. The
Soviets, in attempts to solidify their position in the region,
signed a number of bilateral treaties with many of the region's
coastal states. The Soviets provided a great deal of technical
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TABLE 8
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE WEST CENTRAL ATLANTIC (31) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1.000 MT Inc. Catch 1.000 MT Inc. Catch
1964 12.61 1 0.811.550.0
1965 17.3 4.7 37.30 1.610.0 60.0 3.87 1.07
1966 37.4 20.1 116.18 1.270.0 -340.0 -21. 12 2.94
1967 23.9 -13.5 -36.1 1.280.0 10.0 0.79 1.87
1968 6.8 -17 .1 -71. 55 1.360.0 80.0 6.25 0.5
1969 4.8 -2.0 -29.41 1.450.0 90.0 6.61 0.33
1970 0 -4.8 -100.0 1.416.2 -33.8 -2.33 0
1971 11.22 11.2 2 210.8 14.88 0.691.627.0
1972 73.8 62.6 558.93 1.483.5 -143.5 -8.82 4.97
1973 8.9 -64.9 -87.94 1.390.0 -93.5 -6.30 0.64
1974 25.6 16.7 187.64 1.536.64 146.64 10.55 1.67
1975 69.05 43.45 169.73 1.547.3 10.66 0.69 4.46
1976 23.83 -45.22 -65.49 1.574.52 27.22 1. 76 1.51
1977 0 -23.83 100.0 1.419.02 -155.5 -9.8 0
1978 0 1.852.87 433.85 30.57 0
1979 0 1.780.94 -71. 93 -3.88 0
1980 0 1.790.51 9.57 0.54 0
Sources: 1 1970. Yearbook ofUnited Nations. Food and Agriculture Organization.
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings. Vol. 30. 1971. pp , 224.
2Table C-31.
United Nations. Food and Agriculture Organization. 1980. Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings. Vol. 50. 1981. pp , 256.
Table C-31.
40
TABLE 9
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE EAST CENTRAL ATLANTIC (34) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
163.81 1 14.841964 1,104.0
1965 82.4 -81.4 -49.69 1,200.0 96.0 8.69 6.87
1966 79.3 -3.1 -3.76 1,360.0 166.0 13.83 5.81
1967 153.5 74.2 93.57 1,530.0 164.0 12.01 10.03
1968 318.6 165.1 107.56 1,690.0 160.0 10.46 18.85
1969 569.7 251.1 78.81 2,070.0 380.0 22.49 27.52
1970 612.5 42.8 7.51 2,471.5 401.5 19.40 24.78
1971 789.82 177.3 28.94 2 427.6 17.30 27.242,899.1
1972 848.8 59.0 7.47 3,156.8 257.7 8.89 26.89
1973 942.7 93.9 11.06 3,365.5 208.7 6.61 28.01
1974 1,145.0 202.3 21.46 3,523.15 157.65 4.48 32.50
1975 1,165.74 20.74 1.81 3,534.12 10.97 0.31 32.99
1976 1,315.43 149.69 12.84 3,617.38 83.26 2.36 36.36
1977 1,134.43 -181. 0 -13.76 3,796.28 178.9 4.95 29.88
1978 769.5 -364.93 -32.17 3,268.59 -527.69 -13.90 23.54
1979 526.01 -243.49 31.64 2,823.35 -445.24 -13.62 18.63
1980 942.33 416.32 79.15 3,463.72 640.37 22.68 27.21
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp. 227,
2Table C-34.
1980, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 259,
Table C-34.
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and financial assistance to the fisheries in the area. This
led to a peak year in 1976 for the Soviet fisheries (see
Table 4).
Overfishing started to rear its ugly head in 1977. The
Soviet catch showed a 13.76 percent reduction that year. How-
ever, the region as a whole peaked for the total catch that
year. The Soviet position had already started to deteriorate
in the region. A number of treaties were revoked. The Soviets
were completely excluded from Mauritania's coastal waters. 69
The Soviet catch dropped 41 percent over the next two years.
Many of the nations started expressing desire to protect their
coastal fisheries. Nineteen hundred and seventy nine saw the
region record its lowest catch since 1970.
The Soviets renewed their efforts in the region by
increasing their presence in 1980. In a move to counter this
effort, the West African nations adopted a 200 EEZ. 70 Soviet
access to many ports in the region was terminated. The large
depot at Fernando Po was closed to Soviet vessels as were
coastal waters of Equatorial Guinea. 71 This agreement had
been in effect since 1964.
The Soviet presence in the region had become unwelcome.
Without access to the coastal waters or ports of any of the
coastal states, it's quite unlikely that this region will play
a significant role in the future.
Southeast Atlantic.
The Southeast Atlantic was originally treated much as the
East Central region. The presence of South Africa has always
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been a thorn in the Soviets' side. The catch during the late
1960's and early 1970's remained fairly stable (see Table 10).
The expansion in the East Central region was parallel in
the Southeast Atlantic. Treaties with Angola in 1976 and 1977
did much to spur the Soviet efforts. The Angolan fishing
industry had practically collapsed by 1976. In only four
years, their catch had undergone a 69 percent reduction. 72
The Soviets agreed to equip and train the Angolan fishermen.
Twelve percent of the Soviet catch would be supplied to Angola
in return for Soviet fishing within the coastal waters of
Angola. 73 By the end of 1978, the Southeast Atlantic had be-
come the fourth largest region in terms of Soviet catch.
The following year, the Union of South Africa declared a
200 mile EEZ. 7 4 The resultant Soviet catch underwent a 43
percent reduction in one year alone. In spite of this, the
Soviets still accounted for over one-third of the total
regional catch (see Table 10).
Political instabilities within the region continued to
take their toll on the regional fisheries. The 1980 catch
totals for the region continued their declining trend for the
sixth time in seven years (a 13.71 percent decrease for 1980).
Soviet relations with Angola guarantee their presence in
the region. A recent treaty (1982) guaranteed Soviet assist-
ance to Angola's fishing fleet in return for continued permits
to fish Angolan waters. 75 This treaty is to remain in effect
for ten years.
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TABLE 10
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE SOUTHEAST ATLANTIC (47) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR
%of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
166.81 1 8.831964 1,890.0
1965 360.7 193.9 116.25 2,180.0 290.0 15.34 16.55
1966 361.2 0.5 0.14 2,310.0 130.0 5.96 15.64
1967 251.0 -110.2 -30.51 2,640.0 330.0 14.29 9.51
1968 484.5 233.5 93.03 3,300.0 660.0 25.0 14.69
1969 407.2 -77 .3 -15.95 3,090.0 -210.0 -6.36 13.18
1970 422.2 15.0 3.68 2,457.2 -632.8 -20.48 17.18
1971 438.62 16.4 3.88 2 -36.5 -1.49 18.122,420.7
1972 719.8 281.2 64.11 2,963.7 543.0 22.43 24.29
1973 648.6 -71.2 -9.89 3,114.8 151.1 5.10 20.82
1974 447.48 -201.12 -31.01 2,796.52 -318.28 -10.22 16.0
1975 420.73 -26.75 -5.98 2,525.26 -271.26 -9.7 16.66
1976 841. 25 420.52 99.95 2,722.57 197.31 7.81 30.90
1977 1,047.23 205.98 24.48 2,721.65 -9.92 -0.03 38.48
1978 1,496.36 449.13 42.89 3,262.53 540.88 19.87 45.86
1979 850.66 -645.7 -43.15 2,518.95 -743.58 -22.79 33.77
1980 825.21 -25.45 -2.99 2,173.69 -345.26 -13.71 37.96
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp. 235,
2Table C-47.
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1980, Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 268,
Table C-47.
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Southwest Atlantic.
Without a doubt, this region has the most interesting
history as far as the Soviets are concerned. The key to the
region was the construction of a large modern fishing port in
Cuba in 1965. 7 6 This opened the entire region logistically.
Fisheries research vessels began to explore the local Patagonian
shelf.
Research showed that the Patagonian shelf was an untapped
resource. Soviet vessels began fishing the shelf in 1966 and
caught over 73,000 tons of fish (see Table 11). The following
year saw 200 fishing vessels appear off Argentine waters. This
so enraged the Argentine government that they extended their
territorial seas out to 200 miles. 77
The Soviets were informed of the decrees but delayed in
leaving. By the end of 1967, they had caught 677,700 tons of
hake which accounted for 54 percent of the entire regional
catch.
Finally in June 1968, the Argentine government had enough.
An Argentine naval vessel ordered two large Soviet stern
factory trawlers to standby for boarding and seizure. The
Soviet vessels were attempting to outrun the naval vessel when
a shell burst midships on one of the trawlers. Both vessels
surrendered and were escorted into port. 78 After weeks of
negotiations, both vessels were released and the fishing fleet
left Argentine waters.
The Soviet fleet next showed up off Uruguay. Uruguay was
aware of the Argentine problems and quickly declared their own
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TABLE 11
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE SOUTHWEST ATLANTIC (41) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
1964 1 470.01 0
1965 520.0 50.0 10.64 0
1966 73.3 73.3 100.0 640.0 120.0 23.08 11.45
1967 677.7 604.4 824.56 1,250.0 610.0 95.31 54.22
1968 189.8 -487.9 -71.99 810.0 -440.0 -35.2 23.43
1969 92.6 -97.2 -51. 21 710.0 -100.0 -12.34 13.04
1970 9.7 -82.9 -89.52 663.9 -46.1 -6.49 1.46
1971 9.12 -.06 -6.19 730.32 66.4 10.00 1.25
1972 2.1 -7.0 -76.52 780.3 50.0 6.85 0.27
1973 5.7 3.6 171. 43 920.7 140.4 17.99 0.62
1974 8.4 2.7 47.37 859.25 -61.45 -6.67 0.98
1975 8.68 0.28 3.33 820.36 -38.89 -4.53 1.06
1976 9.71 1.03 11.87 818.14 -2.22 -0.27 1.19
1977 27.94 18.23 187.74 1,039.66 221.52 27.08 2.69
1978 -27.94 100.0 1,281.23 241. 57 23.24 0
1979 2.16 2.16 1,471.83 190.6 14.88 0.15
1980 27.7 25.54 1,182.41 1,320.38 -151.45 -10.29 2.10
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp , 233,
2Table C-41.
1980, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp , 265,
Table C-41.
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200 mile EEZ. The Soviets, having learned from earlier
experiences, moved further north to Brazil. The Brazilians
also quickly declared a 200 mile EEZ effectively closing the
Russians out of the area. In only three years, the Soviets'
catch went from 677,700 tons to only 9,700 tons (a 99 percent
reduction).
The Soviets maintained only a token presence in the region
for the next seven years. In 1977, six Soviet and two
Bulgarian vessels appeared in Argentine waters. Another con-
frontation ensued as three Argentines drowned while boarding a
trawler and a Bulgarian was killed by a shell explosion. 79
The Soviets agreed to accept an Argentine claim of a 200 mile
EEZ but not a 200 mile territorial sea. Once again the Soviet
catch for the region declined (see Table 11).
Finally, in 1980, the Soviet Union and Argentina signed a
treaty authorizing joint research in the Argentine EEZ. 80 It
is highly likely that the treaty could lead to joint ventures.
The Argentines are said to desire the Soviet krill capture and
processing techniques so the Soviets certainly have something
to negotiate with concerning future fishing rights.
Northeast Pacific.
The Soviets expanded into this region as early as 1958
(Alaska). By 1966, they had moved southward into the waters of
the Pacific Northwest. The catch was remaining fairly constant
at about 500,000 tons (see Table 12). However, the Soviets
were rapidly expanding their fleet off Washington and Oregon in
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TABLE 12
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH IN THE NORTHEAST PACIFIC (67) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
USSR
Catch
517.51
476.1
543.6
569.1
434.3
642.8
739.5
656.02
869.2
379.8
697.7
572.6
496.70
185.12
248.83
210.26
59.21
Inc. in
1,000 MT
-41.4
67.5
25.5
-134.8
208.5
96.7
-83.5
213.2
-489.4
317 .9
-125.1
-75.9
-311.58
63.71
-38.57
-151.05
% of
Inc.
-8.0
14.18
4.69
-23.69
48.01
15.04
-11.29
32.5
-56.3
83.7
-17.93
-13.26
-62.73
34.42
-15.5
-71.84
World
Catch
11,180.0
1,110.0
1,210.0
1,040.0
910.0
1,030.0
2,643.5
22,307.1
2,774.5
1,901. 7
2,332.58
2,245.75
2,416.24
1,764.48
1,875.58
1,974.07
1,954.15
Inc. of
1,000 MT
-70.0
100.0
-170.0
-130.0
120.0
1,613.5
-336.4
467.4
-872.8
430.88
-86.83
170.49
-651.76
111.1
98.49
-19.92
% of
Inc.
-5.93
9.01
-14.05
-12.5
13.19
156.65
-12.73
20.26
-31.46
22.66
-3.72
7.59
-26.97
6.3
-5.25
-1.0
USSR
% of
World
Catch
43.86
42.89
44.93
54.72
47.73
62.41
27.97
28.43
31.33
19.97
29.91
25.5
20.56
10.49
13.27
10.65
3.03
Sources: 1United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1970, Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp. 250,
2Table C-67.
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1980, Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 281,
Table C-67.
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efforts to utilize the,large hake stocks. They began to crowd
out American fishermen in pursuit of rockfish.
The United States reacted quickly to extend the U.S.
fisheries jurisdiction nine miles. This was to the surprise
and chagrin of the Soviet Fisheries Ministry.
This did not deter the Soviets from fishing the region.
By 1976, the alewife, Pacific ocean perch, and Pacific halibut
were all suffering from overfishing. 81 This kept the Soviet
catch at a constant level but damaged the American and Canadian
fishermen.
To protect coastal stocks and the Canadian and American
fishermen, Canada declared a 200 mile EEZ and the United States
a fishery conservation zone (FCZ) in 1976. 82 Both nations
quickly set Soviet quotas for the 1977 year. They planned to
phase out Soviet fishing in the region as soon as feasible. By
1980, the Soviet catch had plummeted to only 59,210 tons
(mostly from the American zone).
During 1980, the Soviets were closed out of the USFCZ. In
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President
Carter reacted to place political pressure on the Soviet Union.
In his State of the Union Address, he stated, nI will not issue
any permits for Soviet ships to fish in U.S. waters. n83
In only three years, the value of the Soviet catch in the USFCZ
went from $157 million to zero. This certainly was a blow to
the Soviet fishing industry as well as the economy. Perhaps
the biggest enemy of the Soviet fishing industry is the
Presidium in Moscow.
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This blow effectively removed the Soviets from the region.
Although many embargoes were lifted in 1982, the fishing ban
, 1 I' k 1 " 1 f ' 84was not and w~l most ~ e y rema~n ~n p ace or some t~me.
As long as the ban is in effect, the Soviets will never be able
to return to the region in any significant numbers.
Northwest Pacific.
The Northwest Pacific has become the most important region
fished by the Soviets today. This has not always been the
case however. In the early 1800's the primary resource of
interest in the region was fur. Fish simply supplied
subsistence for the explorers and settlers. The Russians and
Americans were both competing for these same resources. This
led to a Soviet/American treaty in 1824 which stated nthat the
Northern Pacific should be open to citizens of both nations for
f ' h' t d' d 't' n85 Th R' b t d1S 1ng, ra 1ng an nav1ga 1on. e USS1ans a roga e
the treaty in 1834 because American traders insisted on selling
alcohol to the natives. 86
By 1848, American whalers started whaling the Chukchi Sea.
This continued until the whales were driven to extinction in
the area. At the same time, American fishermen started fishing
the Sea of Okhotsk for cod. A joint venture was started a
short time later to provide additional income for the Russian
economy. Although the joint venture dissolved a short time
later because of a lack of storage facilities, the American cod
fishery was to remain important through 1880. 87
The Japanese have fished for salmon on the Kamchatka
Peninsula for centuries. By 1868, the Japanese had developed
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extensive fisheries in the Soviet Far East. Russia officially
acquired the territory in 1875 and quickly signed a treaty
allowing the construction of Japanese shore processing plants. 88
This treaty remained in effect until World War II.
The Soviet presence in the region really expanded during
World War II. The non-aggression treaty with Japan gave the
Soviets a relatively safe area to catch fish. As discussed
earlier, this fish was used to supply the Red Army in their war
89
against Germany.
The expansion had been fairly constant until 1972 when
there was a drop in the catch of 8.19 percent (see Table 13).
The following year more than made up for this decline as the
fishery research vessels discovered the untapped resources of
the Alaskan pollack. The catch skyrocketed over 55 percent in
one year.
The catch continued to increase until 1980 when there was
a slight drop (2.2 percent). There is reason to believe that
the region had reached its limit. Many observers felt that the
huge pollack stock had reached its MSy. 90 If the stocks have
reached their MSY, then it is highly likely that overfishing
will occur in this highly competitive region and the regional
catch will eventually fall.
In spite of such a large catch, the Soviets still account
for only seventeen percent of the regional catch. A number of
other nations also rely heavily on this region for fishery
products. With the removal of the EEZ's from the traditional
high seas, the competition in this region will become even
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TABLE 13
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH IN THE NORTHWEST PACIFIC (61) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
1964 922.81 1 8.0511,470.0
1965 1,114.6 191.8 20.78 12,200.0 730.0 6.36 9.14
1966 1,091. 6 -23.0 -2.06 12,520.0 320.0 2.62 8.72
1967 1,204.2 112.6 10.32 13,370.0 850.0 6.79 9.01
1968 1,302.2 98.0 8.14 14,420.0 1,050.0 7.85 9.03
1969 1,394.0 91.8 7.05 14,490.0 70.0 .49 9.62
1970 1,447.6 53.6 3.85 12,103.4 -2,386.6 -16.47 11.96
1971 2 114.5 7.91 2 11,448.1 11.96 11.531,562.1 13,551.5
1972 1,434.2 -127.9 -8.19 14,296.3 744.8 5.5 10.03
1973 2,232.9 798.7 55.69 16,181.1 1,884.8 13.18 13.8
1974 2,361. 7 128.8 5.79 16,602.54 421.44 2.60 14.22
1975 2,719.04 357.361 15.13 17,253.49 650.95 3.92 15.76
1976 2,751.71 32.65 1.2 17,558.13 304.64 1.77 15.67
1977 2,942.8 191.09 6.94 18,197.55 639.42 3.64 16.17
1978 3,003.22 60.42 2.05 18,439.52 241. 97 1.33 16.29
1979 3,267.55 264.33 8.8 18,317.08 -122.44 -0.66 17.84
1980 3,195.75 -71.8 -2.2 18,776.22 459.14 2.51 17.02
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp. 248,
2Table C-61.
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1980, Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, VoL 50, 1981, pp. 279,
Table C-61.
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greater. The region today accounts for over 25 percent of the
total world catch!9l
Central Pacific.
The Soviets have never really utilized the resources of
the Central Pacific. The largest catch occurred in 1973 when
the Soviet fleet expanded to the California coast (see Table
14). This accounted for eleven percent of the regional catch.
The Soviet presence in the region became only token after 1975.
The West Central Pacific has played even a lesser role in the
Soviet eyes. They started fishing the region in 1979 and
caught only 8,800 tons which accounted for only 0.15 percent of
the regional catch. It is highly unlikely that the region will
grow in significance for the Soviets in the near future.
Southeast Pacific.
The expansion into the Southeast Pacific has only happened
in the last decade. The Soviets pretty much avoided this area
because of the extended territorial seas. However, the Soviets
did sign a minor treaty with Allende-led Chile in 1972 allowing
them access to Chile's territorial sea in return for fisheries
. t 92aSS1S ance. By the end of 1973, the Soviets had caught
39,000 tons for one percent of the regional catch (see Table
15). The fall of Allende led to an abrogation of the treaty
and an end to the Soviet fishing in the region for four years.
The Soviets returned to the region in 1977 when they
agreed to assist Peru in the construction of the Paita fishing
complex. 93 In return for the capital investment and the
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TABLE 14
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC FOR THE YEARS 1968-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
WEST CENTRAL PACIFIC
8.812 2 0.151979 5,687.75
1980 3.59 -5.22 -59.25 5,698.98 11.23 0.20 0.06
EAST CENTRAL PACIFIC
1968 52.81 1 800.01 6.60
1969 25.4 -27.41 -51. 90 760.0 -40.0 -5.0 3.34
1970 20.2 -5.2 -20.47 867.4 107.4 14.13 2.33
1971 1.92 -18.3 -90.59 874.82 7.4 0.85 0.22
1972 12.9 11.0 578.95 935.4 60.6 6.93 1.38
1973 138.1 125.2 970.54 1,222.9 287.5 30.74 11.29
1974 22.2 -115.9 -83.92 1,034.39 -188.51 -15.41 2.15
1975 30.62 8.42 37.93 1,279.32 244.93 23.68 2.39
1976 30.62 -100.0 1,518.58 239.26 18.70 0
1977 1,724.65 206.07 13.57 0
1978 .026 .026 1,811.87 87.22 5.06 .001
1979 .1 .074 204.62 2,021.93 210.06 11.59 .005
1980 .1 -100.0 2,426.81 404.88 20.02 0
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp. 256,
Table C-67.
2United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1980, Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 287,
Table C-67.
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TABLE 15
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH IN THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC (87) FOR THE YEARS 1970-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
1970 13,746.5
1971 12,021.2 -1,725.3 -12.55
1972 35.1 35.1 5,563.0 -6,458.2 53.723 0.63
1973 39.2 4.1 11.68 3,047.9 -2,515.1 -45.21 1.28
1974 -39.2 -100.0 5,302.06 2,254.16 73.96 0
1975 4,380.7 -921.36 -17.38 0
1976 5,779.89 1,399.19 31.94 0
1977 3,936.57 -1,843.32 -31.89 0
1978 54.02 54.02 5,474.26 1,537.69 39.06 0.99
1979 546.57 492.55 911. 79 6,898.8 1,424.54 26.02 7.92
1980 552.35 5.78 1.06 6,224.19 -674.61 -9.78 8.87
Sources: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1980, Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, VoL 50, 1981, pp. 291,
Table C-87.
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technical assistance, the Soviets were allowed to take on
provisions and fuel in Peruvian ports. They were not allowed
to fish Peruvian waters however. It has proven to date to be
very difficult to check Soviet trawlers to ensure that their
haul was caught outside 200 miles. 9 4
The impact of this treaty is quite evident. The Soviet
catch rose from zero in 1977 to 552,350 tons by 1980 (see
Table 15). How much of this catch is from the territorial seas
is unknown but the Peruvian government to date has not lodged
any formal complaints. This may change once the Paita complex
is built and the Peruvians no longer need Soviet capital.
Until this happens though, the Soviet fishing outlook for the
Southeast Pacific certainly looks promising.
Southwest Pacific.
Like the Southeast Pacific, the Soviets waited until the
1970's to move into the region. This was part of their
programmed expansion into the South Pacific. The catch
starting in 1971 climbed steadily for the first few years (see
Table 16). The decline in 1975 was pretty much paralleled by
the regional catch and was most likely not the result of any
political mechanisms. The bulk of the regional catch can be
attributed to foreign fishermen.
The major state in the region, New Zealand, kept a
watchful eye on the Soviets. During the early years, the
Soviets made free use of the local ports in spite of numerous
reported breaches of the 12-mile territorial sea. In 1976, New
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TABLE 16
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (81) FOR THE YEARS 1970-1980
USSR
i. of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1.000 MT Inc. Catch 1.000 MT Inc. Catch
1970 190.0 0
1971 10.4 10.4 215.5 25.5 13.42 4.83
1972 53.7 43.3 416.35 263.8 48.3 22.41 20.36
1973 74.3 20.6 38.36 305.5 41.7 15.81 24.32
1974 88.8 14.5 19.52 340.8 35.3 11.55 26.06
1975 44.77 -44.03 -49.58 273.43 -67.37 -19.77 16.37
1976 78.02 33.25 74.29 356.34 82.91 30.32 21.89
1977 123.01 44.99 57.66 531. 33 174.99 49.11 23.15
1978 72.16 -50.85 -41.34 354.25 -177 .08 -33.33 20.37
1979 70.78 -1.38 -1.91 356.08 1.83 0.52 19.88
1980 69.63 -1.15 -1.62 369.92 13.84 3.89 18.82
Sources: United Nations. Food and Agriculture Organization. 1980. Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings. Vol. 50. 1981. pp. 289.
Table C-81.
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Zealand imposed a port tax but its results were negligible as
the Soviet and regional catch increased by 50 percent.
By 1977, there were 393 foreign vessels operating in New
Zealand waters of which 52 were Soviet. 95 It was believed
that these vessels were simply trying to get as many fish as
possible before a 200 mile EEZ came into effect. When the EEZ
went into effect, the Soviet catch and regional catch dropped
41 and 33 percent respectively. These could be directly at-
tributed to the EEZ. Quotas were established for foreign
fishermen but they were 70 percent lower than before the
claim. 96 These quotas were being reduced annually while
emphasis was being shifted to joint ventures. By 1980 the
quotas for joint ventures exceeded those for foreign fishermen
for the first time.
The Soviets shifted their emphasis in the region to joint
ventures. The liberal joint venture quotas certainly were the
driving factor. Today, nine Soviet trawlers are involved in
joint ventures with an annual quota of 104,100 tons. 97 In
spite of this generous quota, the Soviets were able to only
utilize 31 percent of it.
The local populace has been quite upset with the use of
joint ventures in New Zealand waters. They pressured the
government to concede that all of the joint venture vessels
will be eventually replaced by local vessels. 98 It is easy
to see that the Soviet presence in the area will certainly be
short-term only.
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Indian Ocean.
In the early 1960's, the Soviet Union decided to expand
its operations to the Indian Ocean. Prior to this, the Soviets
had done no fishing in the Indian Ocean. The catch slowly
expanded to a high of 76,000 tons by 1966. 99 However, the
following year, the Arab-Israeli war closed the Suez Canal
setting back the Soviet plans for the region.
The catch for the next eight years fluctuated between
12,000-34,000 tons. There seemed to be no set pattern to these
fluctuations. However, in the middle of 1975, the Suez Canal
reopened, increasing Soviet interest once again. The Soviet
catch for the following year showed an 81 percent increase but
they still only accounted for 0.66 percent of the regional
catch (see Table 17). The Soviet effort in 1977 was just
picking up momentum when India and Sri Lanka both declared 200
mile EEZ's.100 Although the catch reached 78,600 tons in
1977, it quickly dropped back down to 26,000 tons in 1978.
Once again, Soviet efforts were thwarted by 200 mile EEZ
declarations.
There was a slight upturn in 1980 as the catch climbed
back up to 37,280 tons. The Soviets had negotiated with South
Yemen to provide fish for the Yemeni market. The Soviets were
also going to participate in the development of both a fishing
port and a fisheries training center in Aden. The training
center already has 265 graduates with another 124 students at-
tending institutions in the Soviet Union itself. 101
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TABLE 17
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN FOR THE YEARS 1970-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
1970 25.4 2,513.7 1.01
1971 12.9 -12.5 -49.21 2,630.2 116.5 4.63 0.49
1972 16.2 3.3 25.58 2,500.6 -129.59 -4.93 0.65
1973 31.6 15.4 95.06 2,829.0 328.4 13.13 1.12
1974 34.2 2.6 8.23 3,153.21 324.21 11.46 1.08
1975 12.1 -22.1 -64.62 3,175.96 22.75 .72 0.38
1976 21.97 9.87 81.57 3,298.98 123.02 3.87 0.66
1977 78.62 56.65 257.35 3,668.68 369.7 11. 21 2.14
1978 26.02 -52.6 -66.9 3,500.23 -108.45 -2.96 0.73
1979 11.86 -14.16 -54.42 3,568.52 8.29 .23 0.33
1980 37.28 25.42 214.33 3,592.85 24.3 .68 1.04
Sources: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1980, Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp , 272,
Table C-51.
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It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will develop a
large Indian Ocean fisheries in the near future. The regional
desire to keep both the United States and the Soviet Union out
of the region precludes any large acceptance of a Soviet
fishing fleet in the region.
Anarctic.
The Anarctic region certainly holds some promise for the
future. Since the mid-70's, there has been a continued expan-
sion into the region. What started as strictly a Soviet region
has now seen other nations fish as well. The regional catch
peaked in 1980 with 529,210 tons (see Table 18).
The two major resources, the Antarctic icefish and the
Antarctic krill, have accounted for over 80 percent of the
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catch. On many occasions, the large quantity of Anarctic
krill has been discussed but there have been problems
concerning just how to utilize this resource. Until that
problem is rectified, the region's fisheries will be somewhat
hampered.
However, in 1980, fifteen countries signed the Antarctic
P t 103ac . This pact was designed to safeguard the marine
resources from overfishing as well as discover alterna-
tive uses. In all likelihood, this region will never be de-
veloped to be on par with either the North Atlantic or Pacific
fisheries.
Mediterranean and Black Seas.
Looking at Table 19, the first thing that leaps out is the
relatively stable catch totals over the last sixteen years.
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TABLE 18
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE ANTARCTIC FOR THE YEARS 1970-1980
USSR
%of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
1970 431.9 432.0 99.98
1971 246.6 -185.3 -42.9 247.1 -184.9 -42.8 99.8
1972 115.3 -131.3 -53.24 10.3 -131.8 -53.34 100.0
1973 13.5 -101. 8 -882.9 13.5 -101. 8 -88.29 100.0
1974 127.8 114.3 846.67 128.44 128.44 851.41 99.50
1975 64.2 -63.6 -49.76 65.28 -63.16 -49.17 98.35
1976 60.75 -3.45 -5.4 63.65 -1.625 2.49 95.44
1977 359.51 298.76 4.92 387.88 324.23 509.39 92.69
1978 289.07 -70.44 -19.59 401.48 13.6 3.51 72.00
1979 438.43 149.36 51.67 520.56 119.08 29.66 84.22
1980 463.06 24.63 5.62 529.21 8.65 1.66 87.50
Sources: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1980, Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 276-282,
Table C-58.
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TABLE 19
SOVIET AND WORLD CATCH FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEAS (37)
FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR
% of
USSR Inc. in % of World Inc. of % of World
Year Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch 1,000 MT Inc. Catch
1964 239.61 960.01 24.96
1965 251.8 12.2 5.09 990.0 .30 3.125 25.43
1966 307.7 55.9 22.2 1,030.0 40.0 4.04 29.87
1967 300.6 -7.1 -2.31 1,110.0 80.0 7.77 27.08
1968 284.8 -15.8 -5.26 1,030.0 -80.0 -7.21 27.65
1969 138.7 -146.1 -51.3 970.0 -60.0 -5.82 14.30
1970 302.5 163.8 118.10 1,147.3 177.3 18.28 26.37
1971 263.82 -38.7 -12.79 2 -38.5 -3.36 23.791,108.8
1972 283.7 19.9 7.54 1,161.1 52.3 4.72 24.43
1973 285.9 2.2 0.76 1,153.0 -8.1 -0.70 24.80
1974 371.5 85.6 29.94 1,369.94 216.94 18.81 27.12
1975 349.76 -21.74 -5.85 1,294.07 -75.87 -5.54 27.03
1976 369.25 19.49 5.57 1,310.65 16.58 1.28 28.17
1977 244.1 -125.15 -33.89 1,145.32 -154.33 -12.61 21.31
1978 282.01 37.91 15.53 1,231. 48 86.16 7.52 22.90
1979 315.93 33.92 12.03 1,316.09 84.61 6.87 24.01
1980 397.21 81.28 25.73 1,647.46 331.37 25.18 24.11
Sources: 1 1970, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 30, 1971, pp. 230,
2Table C-37.
1980, Yearbook ofUnited Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, Vol. 50, 1981, pp. 262,
Table C-37.
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There have been fluctuations during the period but there is no
real upward or downward trend. In all likelihood, the seas
have both reached their MSY. There should not be any large
increases in the foreseeable future. If there is, a following
major drop will likely occur as the result of overfishing.
A number of countries fish these waters and have done so
for centuries. These waters are probably the longest fished
waters in the world. Their percentage of the world catch has
been declining gradually over the last few centuries.
The Soviets presently account for 25 percent of the
regional catch as they did sixteen years ago. Since the region
is most likely at its capacity already, the Soviet catch or
percentage of the regional catch is unlikely to change.
Inland Waters.
Although the inland waters are not affected by the treaty,
they are a major part of the Soviet response to it. The
maximum efficiency and utilization of these resources can re-
duce the effects significantly.
By looking at Table 20, one is led to the misconception
that the region is producing at its capacity. However, the
inland waterways suffer from a number of major problems. These
problems will have to be rectified.
Pollution has posed problems in the Soviet Union much like
the rest of the world. Many major pollutants have been
disposed of by rivers. These rivers have flowed into
reservoirs and inland seas and lakes killing many fish,
reducing reproduc-
tion and making the living organisms toxic.
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Sources:
TABLE 20
SOVIET CATCH IN INLAND WATERS (07) FOR THE YEARS 1964-1980
USSR Inc. in % of
Year Catch 1.000 MT Inc.
1964 726.5 1
1965 826.4 99.9 13.75
1966 789.0 -37.4 -4.53
1967 816.0 27.0 3.42
1968 780.0 -36.0 -4.41
1969 746.5 -33.5 -4.29
1970 853.4 106.9 14.32
1971 935.42 82.0 9.61
1972 870.0 -65.4 -6.99
1973 849.6 -20.4 -2.34
1974 772.9 -76.7 -9.03
1975 943.97 171.07 22.13
1976 770.31 -173.66 -18.4
1977 770.86 0.55 0.07
1978 730.44 -40.42 -5.24
1979 805.62 75.18 10.29
1980 747.37 -58.25 -7.23
1United Nations. Food and Agriculture Organization. 1970. Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings. Vol. 30. 1971. pp. 215.
2Table C-07.
United Nations. Food and Agriculture Organization. 1980. Yearbook of
Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings. Vol. 50. 1981. pp. 247.
Table C-07.
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Lower water levels in the inland seas have also been a
major contributor. In the Aral Sea alone, a five-foot drop in
d h " d th 1" 't 1 t 104 M f thept ra1se e sa 1n1 y e even percen • any 0 e
spawning grounds are now above water level, further compounding
the problem. The Caspian Sea has similar problems and is
declining as well. The drop in water level is being caused by
the construction of reservoirs and the increase in irrigation
upland from the seas. The Soviets have been increasing funds
to determine how to stabilize the water level. This will be
the key to future increases.
To give an idea of the size of the water resources being
addressed, the Soviet Union has 117,800,000 acres of inland
water. 105 This area is one sixth the size of the Mediter-
ranean and Black Seas combined. However, the potential high
productivity level that can be attained in these waters has
increased their importance (200 Kg/m3). This level is 1,500
times higher than normal. 1 06 It is easy to see how this can
reduce the impact of the treaty.
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CHAPTER V
SOVIET FUTURE
To say that the treaty is going to lower catches for the
Soviets' high seas fishing fleet is a pr~tty safe guess. The
real question is how much and what options do the Soviets have
open to them.
Across the board, every declaration of a 200 mile EEZ has
caused a significant reduction in the catch for that particular
region. The host nation's catch usually showed an increase and
the regional catch was dependent upon how much foreign fisher-
men were involved in the region. Over 90 percent of the
world's utilized fishery resources come from coastal waters. 107
Figure 2 shows this fact quite dramatically.
The Soviet utilization of these coastal resources will be
dependent upon their bilateral agreements with the various
coastal states. Since the EEZ is now an international
standard, the only way to access coastal waters will be through
agreements. The Soviets have a number of agreements and
treaties in effect. It is highly likely that this number will
increase dramatically over the next few years.
The most likely regions to be exploited are the coasts of
South America, Africa, and Indochina. It is highly unlikely
that Soviet vessels will reappear in American or Canadian
EEZ's in the foreseeable future. Europe will always see a
Soviet presence but it will most likely be restricted to the
Baltic, Mediterranean, and the Grey Zone areas. The presence
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of Soviet vessels off the EEC States is likely to diminish
considerably.
In dealing with the developing nations, the Soviets have a
great deal to offer. They have the capital and the technologi-
cal expertise to construct processing plants in the developing
countries. This has already been done in a number of countries
(South Yemen and Peru are just two examples).
The fishing fleet itself is undergoing modernization.
They have a number of smaller, less efficient vessels that are
being phased out. Although these vessels are no longer desired
by the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries, they would be ideal for
many of the developing countries. All of the extra onboard
processing capabilities of the newer vessels would not be re-
quired on a small, coastal vessel. This would solve the
problem of what to do with the old vessels, how to gain access
to various EEZ's, and most importantly, how to further the
communist philosophy. This would also increase these
countries' dependence upon the Soviet Union as Soviet tech-
nicians would be needed to train the locals in vessel operation
and maintenance. These countries would also be dependent upon
the Soviets to provide parts to keep the vessels operational.
This could provide a long-term relationship for the Soviet
fishing fleet.
The bilateral agreements also hold the key to the other
fisheries issues. As was discussed in Chapter II, many of the
areas are subject to negotiations. The issues concerning the
high seas fisheries, anadromous species, and highly migratory
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speoies all are oonoerned wi~h neso~ia~ions. mho Sovio~s c~n
be expected to be difficult negotiators in all of these areas
as the status quo or no agreement is probably in the best
interest of the Soviet fleet.
One change we are likely to see is that the Soviets might
shift their emphasis as to what type of fish they catch. Since
the highly migratory fish will most likely be exempt from the
EEZ's, it would be beneficial for the Soviets to increase their
catch of these fish. In 1979, only 6,992 tons of tuna was
caught, certainly a very small number compared to the overall
Soviet catch. lOa The Soviets, with such a large fleet, will
demand that they be allowed to catch their "fair share." This
certainly will be another bargaining chip for negotiations.
The high seas will certainly become more important as a
fishery resource. It can be expected that it will account for
more than ten percent of the total catch in the next few years.
Without an agreement, all of the large fishing nations will be
able to catch as much as possible. Any agreement would set
quotas reducing any potential catch. It's quite likely that
the negotiations here will not be in good faith by all of the
parties concerned. The competition here will be much greater
than we've seen in the past.
A possible alternative is an International High Seas
Regulatory Agency run under United Nations auspices. This
agency would attempt to manage the high seas fisheries with the
world's well-being as the ultimate goal. Although ideally it
sounds like a good idea, this would most likely turn out to be
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an exercise in futility. These organizations are noted for
their inefficiencies. Very seldom can any kind of consensus be
established concerning worldwide goals. The nations not
involved in high seas fisheries would most likely control and
regulate the high seas fleets. The "Group of 77" is sure to
use this to further their efforts for a New International
Economic Order (NIEO).
The Soviets would join such a body only if they were in a
position to gain from it, either economically or politically.
If they could either control the agency or use it to gain a
political advantage over the United States, they would become a
member. Since the Soviets claim to be a proponent of the
developing countries, they're sure to use this to heighten
their standing.
The Soviets have made one step to counter the treaty's
effects. They have increased their efforts concerning their
inland and own coastal waters. Investments to develop ponds
and reservoirs have increased over the last few years.
Pollution problems have begun to be addressed although it will
take years to undo the damage already done, provided it is
reversible. The water level in the inland seas is being
stabilized so that further degradations will not occur. It's
possible that production in this area could reach 1,000,000
tons in a few years.
A final area of concern deals with the use of joint
ventures. Although a part of negotiations, their significance
warrants a separate discussion. The Soviets have a number of
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joint ventures in progress with more likely in the near future.
The two most notable joint ventures are with the United States
and New Zealand.
With the revoking of all of the Soviet licenses to fish
the USFCZ in 1980, Marine Resources Inc. became the largest
bottom fish force on the U. S. Pacific Coast. In 1981, they
were looking at a goal of 60,000 tons. 1 09 It is highly
significant that this operation was not cancelled when the
other licenses were revoked.
This joint venture pairs up American catchers with Soviet
processors providing the Americans with an opportunity to have
a worldwide market for the low-value bottom species. This pro-
vided a high-volume, economies-of-scale, quality product that
could be competitively priced on the world market place.
The two companies involved--Cold Storage of Bellingham,
Washington and Savrybflot--have formed a 50-50 partnership.
The products are marketed in 14 countries with only ten percent
being sold in the U.S., the Soviet Union, or other Eastern bloc
countries. The company is trying to expand its quotas and
catch for the future years. The long term future is uncertain
as American policy is to eventually phase out all foreign
fishermen.
The New Zealand joint venture is somewhat similar to the
U.S.-Soviet one. there are nine trawlers involved with a quota
of 104,100 tons for 1982. 110 In its initial year, 1980, the
company exported $7.5 million of its fish products to
72
Australia, Italy, France and Greece. l l l This netted the
company a profit in their first year of operation.
This company will probably not last too long in the fore-
seeable future. The local fishermen are extremely upset with
joint ventures and have been placing a great deal of pressure
on the government to revoke the licenses. The New Zealand
government has bowed some as they promised that once the joint
venture vessels can be replaced by local vessels, the joint
venture will be terminated.
Although, in most cases, the joint ventures are considered
temporary measures, the life expectancy is probably greater
than most people anticipate. As long as the host country can
benefit from joint ventures, they will remain in effect.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
The ratification of the UNCLOS treaty has brought about a
new era in the world's high seas fishing industry. No longer
can they ply their trade off foreign shores with the only
restriction being the capacity of the nets or the size of the
hold. With over 90 percent of the utilized resources now under
management schemes and political control, the high seas fleets
will have to change their nmodus operandi." The Soviets having
the largest fleet with the poorest efficiency will probably
have to make the greatest changes.
The World courts will certainly be kept busy for the fore-
seeable future. Too many items in the treaty are left open to
interpretation. As an example, just the term nhabitual n must
be defined. There will be many claims covering the gamut of
the fishing concern.
The Soviets will certainly be looking to protect their own
interests. Large scale negotiations will be in progress to
ensure the Soviets access to as many of the fishing grounds as
possible. Joint ventures can be expected in a number of
regions of the world. It is significant to note that even when
the licenses of the Soviet trawlers were revoked in the USFCZ
in 1980, the joint operation in progress was allowed to
continue. There is a great likelihood that joint ventures and
a more efficient inland and coastal fishery could be the
foundation for future fisheries developments.
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